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On the Origin of Objects is, at heart, an extended search for a non-circular and non-
reductive characterization of two key notions: intentionality (the content or "aboutness" 
distinctive of mental states) and computation (the familiar but elusive tool of much 
cognitive scientific explanation). Only a non-circular and non-reductive account of these 
key notions can, Smith believes, provide a secure platform for a proper understanding of 
the mind. The project has both a negative and a positive aspect. Negatively, Smith rejects 
views that attempt to identify the key notions with lower-level physical properties, 
arguing instead for a more abstract and systemic understanding. This negative effort 
occupies Part I of the book (Analysis). In Part II (Construction), we encounter the 
positive side of Smith's proposal: an attempt to develop a non-reductive analysis of 
computation and meaning able to meet the (rather severe) requirements laid out in Part I. 
 One purpose of this critical review is to lay out this project in fairly simple terms. 
This is necessary since Smith's own treatment and prose sometimes obscures the flow of 
the argument. I suggest that, properly understood, Smith's proposal bears a clear affinity 
to ideas emerging from the dynamical systems movement within Cognitive Science, and 
that this tie-in can help put flesh on several of the more metaphorical characterizations in 
the book. My main criticism is that the book ultimately fails to provide an account able to 
meet Smith's own requirements for a truly non-reductive account of intentionality. This is 
especially the case regarding Smith's commitment to licensing a partition of the world 
based on no a priori assumptions whatsoever. The exercise is a valuable one, however, 
since it forces us to look harder at some foundational assumptions and at least hints at a 
new and refreshing perspective: one in which the key explanatory relations are grounded 




 Brian Cantwell Smith's book On the Origin of Objects (henceforth 
OOO) is a metaphysical tale. The scope is ambitious, the goal almost pre-
Socratic, the aspiration: to extrude ontology from the metaphysical flux. 
The basic topic is the search for a non-circular and non-reductive 
explanation of intentionality. To this end Smith outlines a set of basic 
constraints that any such explanation should meet and attempts to show 
why current efforts to solve the problem are doomed to failure. The 
structure of the book is simple; the content less so. OOO is beautifully 
written but it is so full of framework twists, reversals, promises, 
metaphors and caveats that fleshing out the argument is a slow and 
delicate task. 
 The project has a negative side (Part I: Analysis) and a positive side 
(Part II: Construction). In Part I, Smith challenges the standard view 
according to which intentional properties will be revealed as real in virtue 
of their identity with, or supervenience on, some set of lower-level 
physical properties. It is here that the reader finds a radical shift in the 
way intentional properties are to be accounted for. It is not a question of 
finding a set of narrow or individualistic constituting properties. 
Intentional phenomena are instead regarded as context-dependent and 
institutionally created. This shift has consequences for many of the 
central notions invoked in the standard view (such as the notion of object, 
subject, physics, computation, etc). In particular, the notions of subject 
and object are especially transformed. It is one of the main desiderata of 
Smith's project that we need to earn the subject / object distinction, 
because otherwise our explanatory scheme would be seriously incomplete 
and any metaphysics built upon it rendered shallow or invalid. My view, as 
will become clear, is that Smith fails to meet his own (strong) requirement 
here. But it is a valiant effort nonetheless. 
 In Part II Smith develops what he considers to be an adequate 
explanation of intentionality. Here his own metaphysical view is revealed 
as one story (although not the only one) able to meet all the requirements. 
To what extent Smith's view marks a real departure from mainstream 
philosophical positions on this topic is, however, difficult to evaluate, as 
we are quickly immersed in a superficially new terrain in which many 
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central concepts have been recharacterized and re-defined. The spirit of 
the proposal, however, bears a clear resemblance to that of a Dynamical 
Systems perspective in Cognitive Science (more of which below). Moreover 
this dynamical approach, I will suggest, provides many of the tools needed 
to clarify some of Smith's more metaphorical characterizations. The 
position defended in the book (unfortunately) shares the Dynamical 
Systems approach's inefficiency in reconstructing higher-level, mostly 
linguistic notions. 
 Despite all this, there is something overwhelmingly right about the 
ideas Smith puts forward. If we want to understand how intentionality 
works, a good explanatory strategy is indeed to confront the complex 
interactive processes that bind subject and object into a whole, and to try 
to then account for the subject / object distinction itself. By contrast, the 
general model of explanation that informs most recent attempts to 
naturalize intentionality looks to be governed by two (often unremarked) 
physicalist assumptions: faith in a causal, reductive explanatory strategy, 
and faith in a (metaphysical) notion of individualistic constitution (again, 
see below). The multiple and complex interactive relations that 
characterize the cognizer's dealings with the world are often underrated by 
such models. Subjects and objects are treated as though they are pre-
given entities, with well-defined boundaries that figure in causal 
explanations of behavior. By challenging this presupposition, Smith helps 
us to re-think our assumptions and hints at a new and refreshing 
perspective: one in which the key explanatory relations are grounded in 
holistically characterized, socio-pragmatic notions.  
 
 
1. The Problem. 
 
 The target problem, as I said, is intentionality. It is, to put it 
roughly, how some noises, or marks on paper, or computer programs, or 
neural events reach out to some object or property in the world. The need 
is for an account of how and why this property of 'being about something 
else' arises1. What we need, to use one of Smith's numerous examples 
is: 'an account of why, when we look out the window, we see a tree —i.e., 
have a (potentially) conscious experience of or about a tree, not of a two-
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dimensional leafy and barked surface, let alone of a pattern of incident 
electromagnetic radiation ...' (OOO, p. 13). 
 Although one of the multiple ways of reading this book is to see it 
as a discussion about reference, Smith seems less worried about how 
particular words and representations come to refer than about the 
putative phenomenon of reference in general. It is the parsing of the world 
into states that can be referred to and states that can refer that he finds 
puzzling.  His question is what makes the world parsable into states that 
refer and states that are referred to or, in other words, how it is that the 
mind/world distinction emerges. What is wanted is an account of 
intentionality that doesn't presuppose either the subject or the object and 
that can therefore provide an explanation of how the world is as it is 
taken to be by a subject. This is a foundationalist project. Yet, the 
challenge is to build this metaphysical foundation without relying on any 
a priori assumptions. 
 The problem, thus characterized, has a Kantian resonance also to 
be found in work such as McDowell (1994) and Adrian Cussins (1992). 
Seen through this Kantian lens, Smith's message may be summarized as 
the thesis that representational experiences and practices are actively 
acquired, and that the faculty by which one exercises one's conceptual 
and non-conceptual capacities in thinking and judging is dynamically 
constrained both by spontaneity (the subject's cognitive capacities) and 
receptivity (the realm where empirical content is to be found). As he tells 
us at the very beginning of the book, his 'metaphysics —a philosophy of 
presence— ... aims to steer a path between the Scylla of naive realism 
and the Charybdis of pure constructivism' (OOO, p. 3). In order to steer 
that path, we are invited to join a long trip (full of detours) that begins in 
Part I with the analysis of computation, its foundation and its role in 





 Computers are intentional artifacts. Theories of computation are 
chosen as an example of how various issues involved in the explanation of 
intentionality are standardly approached, and of how they might 
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alternatively be treated. A Theory of Computation, it is argued, has to 
meet two essential criteria: an empirical criterion, or the requirement that 
the theory do justice to computational practices, and a conceptual criterion 
according to which the theory should be a foundation for the 
Computational Theory of Mind. In the justification of these two criteria we 
can already see two of the main components of Smith's view. The first 
component is a very strong anti-reductionism. The other is a dynamical 
approach towards intentionality.  
 In order to meet the empirical criterion, the theory has to illuminate 
and explain the differences between intuitively different forms of 
representation, program and machine. But the notion of a representation, 
program or machine as being of such-and-such a type is, Smith argues, 
not explicable solely in term of properties internal to the computational 
system. What it is to be this particular program or this particular 
representation can only be individuated by appealing to properties 
external to the system itself. A theory of computation that takes a 
reductionist approach towards such complex intentional artifacts will not 
be able to meet the empirical constraint.  
 Smith believes the roots of this reductionist mistake lie in what he 
calls the 'binary model of semantics'. The binary model takes computation 
to involve only two types of entities: the program itself, and the domain or 
subject matter. But computation, it is argued, involves at least an extra 
factor: the process via which the program is being executed. The 
conflation of the notions of program and process leads to what Smith sees 
as the mistaken view that computation is purely syntactic; it also 
encourages a static view of the world and the entities that populate it, 
and has important consequences in Cognitive Science and Philosophy of 
Mind. According to Smith, an analysis of computation based on a 
multifactor model of semantics (instead of a binary one) would better fit 
our computational practices and would invite a more dynamic approach 
both to what it is to be an object and to intentionality itself. It would shift 
attention away from ' ... what it is to be an object ... [and] instead focus on 
what it is to behave or act or participate or be treated as an object' (OOO, p. 
36). Similarly, 'intentionality will be reconstructed not so much in terms 
of a static notion of meaning or significance, but instead in active terms of 
being meaningful or being significant' (Ibid.). 
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 The conceptual criterion, even though it concerns not so much the 
contents of the theory but its form or its use, moves things in the same 
anti-reductionist direction. That a theory of computation ought to provide 
a foundation for the Computational Theory of Mind means that in order to 
understand how the various practical representational practices collected 
under the label 'computation' (Smith's computation in the wild) belong to 
the natural world, we should not look downwards in the direction of the 
internal, constitutive properties of computers and programs. Since 
computers are already intentional devices, it wouldn't be methodologically 
or epistemologically appropriate to rely on computation as a way of 
explaining intentionality. If intentionality itself lies at the core of 
computational practices, there is really no such thing as an independent 
theory of computation (cf. OOO, pp. 73-75) —no abstract theory about the 
programs and representational powers of these socially constructed 
intentional artifacts. Providing a foundation as a result involves looking 
away from the syntactic properties of computational devices and towards 
the institutional frameworks that make them count as intentional 
machines. Inevitably, current theories of computation fail to meet these 
highly demanding criteria2. 
 The traditional use of computational ideas as a means of explaining 
intentionality thus involves committing what Smith calls an inscription 
error: 'a tendency for a theorist or observer, first to write or project or 
impose or inscribe a set of ontological assumptions onto a computational 
system ... and then, second, to read those assumptions or their 
consequences back off the system, as if that constituted an independent 
empirical discovery or theoretical result' (OOO, p. 50). The notion of 
inscription error is not entirely new, and has a familiar correlate in AI 
where it surfaces as the handcoding problem. A good example of this kind 
of error is the AM program, a program designed to prove mathematical 
theorems. The program was extremely successful but, as Lenat, the 
programmer, later conceded, the main reason for the success lay in the 
very representation notation used to write the program, i.e., in the 
amount of mathematical knowledge implicit in LISP (see Lenat, 1983 and 
Ritchie and Hanna, 1984). 
 Smith's treatment of computation ultimately implies a very radical 
position, completely different to mainstream foundational projects in 
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Cognitive Science. Such projects inherit important reductive assumptions 
from the explanatory model of physics. Cantwell Smith's claim, however, 
is that intentionality is not reducible to computation or physics, and that 
a theory of computation itself needs a metaphysical underpinning in order 
to meet both the empirical and the conceptual criteria (cf. OOO, pp. 69-76). 
The position defended here is quite close to that of another radical anti-
reductionist, Robert Brandom (1994). Both Smith and Brandom propose a 
different kind of explanatory scheme for intentionality, in which the 
explanans includes higher level features such as skilled know-how and 
social frames of action. The rupture of the higher-to-lower explanatory 
strategy calls into question one of the core metaphysical notions in the 
framework of scientific explanation, the metaphysical notion of 
constitution. Although Smith doesn't frame his views in terms that involve 
a criticism of the notion of constitution, it is not difficult to see how this 
might work. 
 The notion of constitution I have in mind is the one at work in the 
thesis that what makes a thing into a thing of a certain kind is the 
relation between that thing and the stuff it is made of. Although there are 
other, more contextually oriented, ways of accounting for the exact nature 
of a particular thing (see below), constitution, understood in this narrow 
and individualistic sense, seems to be at the root of the model of 
explanation that informs most contemporary naturalistic models of 
intentionality. This notion of constitution is also answerable for the 
demand of cashing out the connections between the internal properties of 
an entity and its surroundings in causal terms. Roughly, this is how these 
two ideas fit together. A particular piece of metal is constituted as e.g. a 
piece of gold if it is made of the right stuff, if its composition has the 
atomic number 79. What it is for a piece of metal to be gold is then fully 
explained by appealing to the properties of its internal structure. But it is 
also its internal structure that is important in accounting for whatever 
causal powers that piece of gold might have3. 
 Most naturalistic approaches to intentionality aim to discover some 
set of lower level, non-semantic, properties in terms of which semantic 
properties are metaphysically constituted, e.g. those properties that make 
a given representation into the representation it is and that will explain 
why it is that representation (and hence why it has the semantic 
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properties it has) rather than some other. The search is for those non-
semantic properties that play a (metaphysical) constitutive role in the 
instantiation of semantic properties. Underlying the model of explanation 
at work in contemporary naturalistic proposals there is thus not just the 
general physicalist bias mentioned earlier, but also the additional idea 
that what makes a thing into a thing of a certain kind is the relation 
between that thing and the stuff of which it is made. 
 But there is also a more contextually oriented alternative to this 
way of accounting for the exact nature of a particular thing. John 
Haugeland and Tim van Gelder have recently explored this possibility (Cf. 
Haugeland 1993 and van Gelder, 1993), referring to it as the 'holistic' 
alternative:  
 
Roughly, holists see the fundamental nature of things as depending 
only upon some larger whole to which they belong ... metaphysical 
holists see constitution as solely a matter of context; an individual 
entity is what it is in virtue of some larger structure or pattern into 
which it fits ... If an entity is constituted as an A holistically, then 
to understand that entity as an A you have to understand the 
relevant larger whole and how As fit into it. To render an A 
intelligible as an A is to articulate its place in the larger whole. 
(van Gelder 1993, p. 67) 
 
 To avoid confusion between the individualistic and the holistic 
notions of constitution, I propose to label the latter notion 'institution'. 
Institution is thus a context-oriented way of understanding what makes a 
particular entity into the entity it is. To say of something that it is 
instituted by such-and-such properties is to claim that its fundamental 
nature in best accounted for in terms of the properties of some specific 
context in which the entity is manifest, and thus that to understand the 
entity as an entity of that particular kind involves an appreciation of the 
properties of that context. John Haugeland gives the familiar example of 
the ontology of chess pieces (Haugeland 1993, 4). Suppose we ask what 
makes something a queen in chess? Obviously queens are made of some 
material or another but this individualistic notion of constitution will not 
help us understand the fundamental nature of a queen. What makes 
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something a queen can only be understood by focusing on the role that 
the piece plays in the larger game of chess and hence by focusing on 
contextual properties such as the rules of chess4. 
 Constitution and institution are not, of course, exclusive 
ontological relations. In most cases, that something is an entity of a 
particular kind results partially from the stuff it is made of and partially 
from the (environmental, social, legal, political, etc.) context in which the 
entity is located. However, there are countless entities for which the only 
way of getting at what they really are, and the only way of explaining why 
they behave how they do, is to look at the contexts that institute them, not 
the stuff they are made of. This is obviously true in the case of 
conventions and social institutions. Their nature, character and function 
are completely dependent on the socio-political context and cultural 
practices of a country or a community. Even though these are obviously 
instantiated by organizations of matter of some kind or another, the stuff 
they are made of doesn't make them the entities they are, and it certainly 
doesn't help to explain why they behave in one way rather than another.  
 One way of understanding Smith's notion of computation and, as we 
shall see, of intentionality itself, is through this institutional lens. That 
doesn't mean that the constitutive properties of computational and 
intentional phenomena (in the narrow and individualistic sense of 
constitution just explained) don't play any role. It rather means that what 
it is to be a program or a particular representation is always something 
partly context-dependent. It is the result of a delicate balance between 
what is out there —constitutively speaking— and the structures within 
which it is institutionally framed. Keeping this idea in mind will help us 
to better understand the middle path between Realism and 





 Smith quickly introduces a general methodological requirement that 
plays an essential role both in the computational context analyzed above 
and in the metaphysical story to be developed later. This methodological 
criterion is dubbed a Principle of Irreduction and 'it mandates that no 
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theoretical assumption ... be given a priori pride of place' (OOO, p. 77). The 
ideal situation would be one in which the foundations of a computational, 
intentional or metaphysical theory are not grounded in any assumption µ 
for any µ. If this turns out to be unfeasible, then for any category µ in 
which our theory is grounded, one should be prepared to say 'where one 
bought it; how much one paid; how one got it from there to here' (cf. OOO, 
p. 78). 
 One deep assumption underlying theories of computation, of 
intentionality, and metaphysics is the notion of a subject / object split. 
The role of this particular µ begins to be unraveled in Chapter 3, where we 
encounter a new set of requirements, this time directly related to the 
metaphysical enterprise and not just to the theory of computation. Think 
of e.g. traditional Realism (upper-case 'R'), a position associated with 
natural sciences and roughly characterized by the defense of two theses: 
that the world is external to the subject and that it exists independently 
of the subject's cognitive abilities. By taking the world to be external to and 
independent of the subject, traditional Realists are committing (according 
to Smith) an inscription error of the kind mentioned earlier. They are 
grounding their metaphysics in the (as-yet-unjustified) µ that the subject 
and the world are two independent entities, and also the (as-yet-
unjustified) µ that there is a univocal perspective on reality (cf. OOO, p. 
89). 
 Against such a position, Smith argues for a unitary, commonsense 
realist account (lower-case 'r') that incorporates the intuition that there is 
a world out there, but that denies the idea that this world is external to or 
independent of the subject, i.e., it denies the idea that there are, as it 
were, two different entities: a world —full of clear-cut, univocal objects 
and properties— and a subject who takes no part in the makings of that 
world. By denying that duplex, independent structure of world and subject, 
by claiming that 'the world, our world, is one' (OOO, p. 103), we are 
supposed to leave theoretical space for an explanation of how both sides 
of the same metaphysical coin simultaneously emerge. Or, at the very 
least, we leave space that can be filled by a justification of our particular 
assumptions (our particular µs) concerning the existence and nature of 
both subjects and objects.  
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 The need to earn the subject / object distinction is just one of 
several constraints offered as desiderata for a successful metaphysics. 
One might think that Smith's insistence on questioning this distinction 
is a clear sign that he is conflating the elaboration of a theory of 
intentionality with the project of constructing a basic metaphysics5. 
However, it is not so much a matter of conflating two different enterprises 
as it is of establishing the dependence of the former on the latter. Part of 
what makes Smith's proposal a genuine alternative is precisely this 
reversal in the order of priorities: in order to get a theory of intentionality, 
we have first to develop a metaphysical theory. Or, at least, we have to re-
think the one we have in such a way that some important conditions are 
met. I have already mentioned one such condition: to give an account of 
(not take for granted) the subject / object distinction. The others, some of 
which we are already familiar with, may be summarized as follows: (i) a 
successful metaphysics has to be anti-reductionist: ' every distinction 
must be wrested from the same metaphysical flux ... everything, including 
physical objects, human societies, truth, beauty, reason and mathematics 
.. are to be drunk from this one same cup' (OOO, p. 1016); (ii) a successful 
metaphysics has to acknowledge the perspectival character of knowledge, 
i.e., it must not be Objective (upper-case 'O') but objective (lower-case 'o'); 
(iii) a successful metaphysics should find a way of doing justice to 
pluralism without succumbing to rampant relativist positions; (iv) a 
successful metaphysics has to be open to the fact that all intentional 
processes are located, embodied, perspectival and pluralist in a dynamic 
and potentially unstable sense (cf. OOO, pp. 109-110); (v) a successful 
metaphysical story has to account for the fact that what makes something 
a particular object is the result both of the cognizer's work to establish 
reference despite the troublesome flux and the flux fighting back against 
the subject's cognitive abilities. And finally, (vi) a successful metaphysics 
has to provide an explanation of this lower-case realism. Again, in the 
spirit of the principle of irreduction, the theorist should be able to say 
'how, why, and what it is for an intentional agent to have a world-directed 
commitment' (OOO, pp. 110-111). 
 One question that immediately arises is just how different the 
traditional and the commonsense versions of realism really are. At first 
blush, it seems perfectly possible to be a (more or less traditional) Realist 
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(upper-case 'R') without flouting —at least most of— the requirements 
Smith is advocating. Take, the first Realist thesis, the thesis that the 
world is external to the subject. The key issue seems to be how much 
structure we allow that world out there to have. It is typical of a traditional 
Realist position to take the world to be a certain, fixed way. The duty of 
the intelligent cognizer is then to find out about that ready-made world 
(perhaps through the development of scientific theories). The main 
difference between this and Smith's position is that for Smith the world is 
certainly out there but it is not ready-made in any way that renders the 
cognizer's or the scientists' views uniquely correct. The independent world 
is a flexible and unstable metaphysical flux: it is not a fully structured 
realm, already sliced up into objects and properties. 
 Similar comments apply to the second main thesis of Realism: that 
the world exists independently of the experiencing subject. This, too, 
could be accommodated within Smith's view if that independence is located 
at the appropriate level of unstructured reality. As we shall see, one of 
Smith's main contentions is that the metaphysical flux itself (that 
undefined, unstable putty) only becomes populated by objects and 
properties —a step up in organizational structure— once one part of that 
flux (the part that will eventually become the subject) achieves a certain 
kind of disconnection from the rest. It is only then that other chunks of 
the metaphysical flux can be seen as objects, as things out there. Smith 
talks, in this vein, of an s-region and an o-region of the flux: the 
precursors of the subject and object respectively —new categories 
designed to avoid the inscription error of talking too soon of subject and 
object. They are like the proto-subject and the proto-object of standard 
metaphysics, still too embedded in some non-individuated pattern of 
structure to count as subject and object proper. The key issue for the 
realism / Realism distinction thus seems to concern the amount of 
structure with which we are ready to credit the metaphysical flux. The 
more structure it has, the closer you get to a traditional Realist view; the 
less structure the closer you get to the so-called 'symmetrical realism' 
defended by Smith. The problem with traditional realism, Smith thinks, is 
that it is unable to account for the emergence of the subject / object 
division itself. Yet, Smith's own position, for all his intended monism, 
still keeps falling back into the same old dichotomy, now expressed via 
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the notions of s-region and o-region. We are told that this is just a trick, 
not to be taken seriously; a prop to help us until all the details of the 
final picture are in place. But the reader is kept waiting rather too long 
(until the very last chapter of the book). And when she gets there it is not 
at all clear whether an innocent account of subject / object emergence 
has indeed been provided. It would be unfair, however, to pursue such 
radical criticisms before at least sketching the rest of the positive 





Smith introduces a dizzying number of distinctions and re-definitions 
which I will swiftly rehearse before showing how they fit into his general 
argument. The main ones to keep in mind are:  
(i) The distinction between particularity and individuality. Although 
Smith acknowledges that the ideas of particularity and individuality 
overlap in our everyday conception of medium-size physical objects, they, 
he argues, respond to different metaphysical motivations. On the one 
hand, 'particular' means 'something like "occurrent": something that is 
located or that happens, something that is embodied' (OOO, p. 117), as 
when we talk about that (particular) bottle of wine we had last night or 
yesterday's cup final. The notion of individuality, on the other hand, is 
meant to capture 'whatever it is about an entity that supports the notion 
of individuation criteria ... Individuality is what allows one to say of one object 
that it is one; or of two, that they are two' (OOO, p. 119) (Smith counts not 
just things like chairs, tables, and people as individuals, but also types, 
properties and relations). Individuality, unlike particularity, is linked to 
the idea of discreteness, the idea of integrity within some boundaries. 
(ii) The distinction between property and feature: 'the term 'property' is 
reserved, at least informally, for qualities or ways of being or types that do 
require objects for their exemplification; the term 'feature', for things that 
do not' (OOO, p. 125), as e.g. in 'it is raining'.  
(iii) The distinction between individuality, identity (lower-case 'i') and 
Identity (upper-case 'I'). The (traditional) notion of Identity (upper-case 'I', 
also called identicality to avoid confusion) is extensional and it is a clear-
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cut notion; either two things are Identical or they are not. The notion of 
identity (lower-case 'i') that Smith introduces is not related to this 
property. Instead 'it has to do with what makes something be the thing 
that it is' (OOO, p. 132). It is an intensional notion. Diffusions (such as 
fog), abstractions (such as melancholy), and collectives (such as groups of 
people) can have identities without necessarily being individuals, or 
supporting individuation criteria. 
(iv) The distinction between physics (lower-case 'p') and Physics (upper-
case 'P'). The upper-case notion of Physics is characterized as a value-
free, Objective, True, Rational empirical inquiry, while the lower-case 
version is 'physics-as-it-actually-practiced, complete with political battles, 
elaborate and often messy laboratory procedures, complex instruments 
and documents, power struggles, aesthetic judgments and other 
paraphernalia of a socially engrained and highly professionalized 
discipline' (OOO, p. 139) 
(v) The distinction between material and physical. 'Material' is used to 
refer to 'our ordinary commonsense notion of physicality' (OOO, p. 141), as 
when we refer to e.g. table and chairs. 'Physical' is whatever belongs to 
the lower-case realm of 'physics'.  
(vi) The distinction between first, second and third realms. The first 
realm is the realm of complete and total particularity, i.e., forces, fields, 
spatio-temporal positions. It is constituted by our common understanding 
of the material world. The second realm includes people, their 
experimental apparatus, their books, papers, conferences. Tracing this 
definition back, we can see that this realm is (lower-case) physical since 
it includes all the social, aesthetic and common practices of the study of 
physics. The third realm is abstract and universal. It contains objects such 
as types, numbers, sets and physical laws. Physical laws don't apply to 
themselves though. They apply to events in the first realm. 
 In order to reconstruct Smith's position, we not only have to get a 
grip on these distinctions, we have also to be aware of a disconcerting 
maneuver that will feature throughout the whole book: it has the flavor of 
a reductio and it involves making a particular position the center of the 
discussion, as though it were the right view, only to later show that the 
assumptions underlying that view are mistaken and that the position 
itself should be rejected. This is how the traditional view that favors 
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Physics as a source of ontological grounding for a theory of intentionality 
is handled: 'The question on the table is not whether physicalism is right 
... The aim is ... to see what contribution it can make towards metaphysical 
understanding ... The aim is to lean on physics —or at least on some of its 
ontological commitments— only in order to make some points in terms of 
which ... to describe the metaphysical view to which in fact I am 
ultimately committed' (OOO, pp. 152-153). 
 Why is physicalism sometimes thus favored? Smith rehearses some 
reasons for its appeal. One is an interest in naturalism, taken as the 
methodological correlate of Realism: the idea, roughly, that if at the end of 
the day everything that exists can be completely characterized at the 
physical level, then a special interest in physicalism is justified. Another 
is a matter of ontological hygiene: physicalism is said to provide a general 
guarantee against bizarre ways of partitioning reality. A final incentive 
spins around the idea of implementation, the idea that building 
something is a good way to understand what it is to be that something.  
 With all these (apparently) good reasons to embrace physicalism, 
shouldn't we just go for it? Smith's argument attempts to show that 
Physics (upper-case 'P') can sustain a basic notion of particularity —of 
located and embodied, continuous and deictic fields— but not a notion of 
individuality. Physics does not have the resources, Smith claims, to 
provide the individuation criteria needed to turn this metaphysical flux of 
particularity into discrete individuals: 'neither the third realm itself, nor 
the relation it bears to the first realm, is part of the subject matter of 
physics itself ... nothing non-particular is itself governed by physical law' 
(OOO, p. 156). It cannot provide the interpretative parameters to turn 
those deictic fields into e.g. a table, the property 'red' or the relation 'to be 
the mother of', all of which are wholly discrete individuals. The claim 
'there are no physical objects' (OOO, p. 178) doesn't sound as radical as it 
otherwise might when seen in this context. It doesn't mean, as one might 
think, that there is nothing out there to support our common-sense 
notion of an object. Instead the claim is that the items Smith has 
characterized as individuals (a category that includes our common-sense 
notion of object) are not ontologically basic: 'instead they are part of the 
epistemic structure of physics-the-discipline. Not only that; they are 
absolutely crucial, epistemically. They are necessary for us, as epistemic 
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agents, to calculate anything, to figure anything out, to allow physics to be 
useful. In sum: they are constructs of the second-realm' (OOO, p. 178). 
 The methodological correlate of this metaphysical conclusion is 
what Smith calls the Criterion of Ultimate Concretness, according to 
which 'no naturalistically palatable theory of intentionality —of mind, 
computation, semantics, ontology, objectivity— can presume the identity or 
existence of any individual object whatsoever' (OOO, p. 184). This means, 
among other things, that no naturalistically palatable theory of 
intentionality can presume the subject/object distinction. Otherwise the 
theory will not be able to account for how intentional properties arise. 
Overall, the main conclusion regarding the issue of physicalism is that 
Physics cannot provide any foundational insight as the base for a theory 
of intentionality. Since objects are ultimately 'inexorably cultural, 
biological, political, psychological, social, evolutionary, historical, 
economic, and so on' (OOO, p. 188), 'physicists will have to look to a theory of 
intentionality for an account of the notion of an individual, not the other way 
around' (OOO, p. 180). 
 For a reader with anti-reductionist inclinations, these proposals are 
clearly tempting. The account has the additional virtue of bringing to light 
some of the problems that arise when we invoke the micro-properties onto 
which our representations are supposed to supervene as the properties 
that must account for the causal efficacy of those representations. It is 
not that there is nothing out there that makes e.g. a chair a chair (a chair 
is something material made of some chunk of physical stuff). But what 
narrowly and individualistically constitutes something as a chair —as a 
specific chunk of stuff about which Physics can give us details— is a 
partitioning of the metaphysical flux that is not provided by Physics 
itself6. 
 Such a line of thought is a welcome change from the dominant 
reductionist picture of cognition. However, given the re-definitions, re-
partitions and re-characterizations involved in this analysis, the reader 
(or, at least, this reader) cannot help but find herself wondering how much 
of this makes real contact with those current positions (with their own 
definitions, partitions and characterizations). In other words, once the 
meanings imposed upon the key notions in the debate have been altered 
so much with respect to our standard notions of e.g. 'physics', 'property', 
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'individual', 'particular' and so forth, how are we supposed to evaluate the 
real distance between Smith's proposal and the traditional view? The 
usual way to criticize a view is to keep constant many features of the 
normal backdrop and to focus attention on just those places that will 
make a difference to the final outcome (on pain of begging the question or 
committing an equivocation fallacy). Here, by contrast, we are invited to 
alter both the background and the key features of the resultant position. 






 We turn now to the Second Part of the book, in which Smith aims to 
meet all the requirements and avoid all the problems displayed in Part 
One. The key positive notion here is the idea of registration, and the goal 
is to understand how it arises out of the metaphysical flux. The notion of 
registration is introduced to avoid the inscription error of taking for 
granted the split between a conception and that which it is a conception 
of. In this sense, registration is quite close to perception. Unlike 
perception however, registration includes all aspects of intentionality, not 
only those relating to what is present for the subject at a given moment: 
'[b]y "register" I mean something like parse, make sense of as, find there to 
be, structure, take as being a certain way —even carve the world into ...' (OOO, 
p. 191). 
 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the essential features of registration. 
Firstly registration involves an asymmetrical division of responsibility. The 
s-region takes the responsibility while the o-region works against it 
courtesy of the instability of the metaphysical flux. Secondly, to register 
something as something is an intensional act. Registration is an 
intentional act and carries both an 'implication of alignment with the 
external situation ... and a sense of involvement or engagement with the 
world' (OOO, p. 196). Finally, the subject of registration is not restricted to 
the biological subject. Entire language communities and bodies of practice 
can also share the responsibility for taking of an object to be such and 
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such. They can do this either directly or via the cultural baggage accrued 
by the individual subjects themselves7. 
 We said earlier that registration is akin to perception. The main 
difference, though, is that whereas perception can only occur in the 
presence of what is perceived, registration actually requires separation 
and distance between (what Smith calls) the s-region and the o-region. The 
simple tracking of one region by the other —a connection without 
distance— doesn't count as registration. In simple tracking the s-region 
and the o-region are insufficiently distinct and insufficiently separate (cf. 
OOO, p. 219). What we need is to break this causally-driven servo-loop; to 
break effective coupling and yet maintain a certain coordination. A nice 
example is that of the super-sunflower. A super-sunflower is a (fiction) 
species of sunflower whose members have the following property: they not 
only track the sun (in the way ordinary sunflowers do) but are also able to 
continue to do so even when the sun disappears. In that way, when the 
sun reappears again they are better oriented toward the light and thereby 
enjoy a selective advantage over ordinary sunflowers. The example also 
helps clarify the point about asymmetrical responsibility: the s-region, the 
super-sunflower, takes the extra responsibility of keeping track of the sun 
even when it disappears. The sun just moves around in the way it does. It 
is up to the super-sunflower to 'keep an eye' on it. 
 The requirement of separation between the s-region and the o-
region yields a set of essential properties of registration. It is because s- 
and o-regions are separated that the extra task of maintaining 
coordination arises, and the s-region must assume extra responsibility. It 
is also this break in effective coupling that ushers in the possibility for 
error, because 'there is no reason to guarantee ... that the retracted 
mechanism will be able to mimic perfectly the distal regularity with which 
it is "striving" to maintain alignment' (OOO, p. 223). Smith calls this view 
a philosophy of presence but it should be clear that the presence of the o-
region essentially involves its absence. It is this occasional absence of 
the o-region that enables the s-region to impose a certain kind of 
stabilization in which the metaphysical flux of the o-region is treated as a 
unity and is taken as an object. Given the dynamical relations between s- 
and o-regions, the s-region has to compensate for the various changes in 
order to bring the world to presence, in order to fix some aspect of the flux 
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into what we think of as an object. In doing that in a sort of acrobatic 
fashion —full of twists, leaps and unstable movements— the s-region 
makes itself a subject: ' ... the first emergence of the "subject" as an 
individual would be as a long-term integral or aggregate of that which it 
must compensate for, in order to stabilize the rest of the world' (OOO, p. 240). 
The driving vision here is of an active process of stabilization through 
which 'reference is achieved' (OOO, p. 263). This achievement, however, is 
never completely stable and therefore the idea of a completely context-
independent representation emerges as a kind of theoretical fiction.  
 The notions of s-region and o-region are thus designed to avoid an 
inscription error regarding the distinction between subject and object. 
Once again Smith hopes to levitate himself above any ontological 
commitments in order to provide a non-grounded foundational 
metaphysics. However, it is difficult to see how the notions of s- and o-
region can help him to achieve this goal. We may grant that some of the 
properties associated with these notions are indeed different to the ones 
generally associated with 'subject' and 'object'. However, in terms of the 
metaphysical picture, the notions still play the role of an ontological 
commitment. One difference, however, is that Smith aims to obey the rules 
of his Principle of Irreduction, i.e., he tries to tell us where he bought 
those assumptions, how much he paid for them and how he got them from 
one place to another. So, even if Smith's metaphysical ambition is 




6. Conceptual Registration. 
 
 Smith aims, we saw, to cut a path between Realism and 
Constructivism. This metaphysical ambition also has a correlate within 
the theory itself. Chapter 9 explores and characterizes this as the idea of 
a middle distance. The reader is already familiar with the idea behind that 
expression, the idea of partial interdependence and partial co-constitution 
between subject and object. This time, however, the aim is to apply that 
notion in a more sophisticated sphere: the logical structure of property 
exemplification. What is at issue is how to accommodate the notions of 
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object and property within the compositional structure of cognitive 
representation. Unfortunately, given Smith's position, it is difficult to see 
how objects and properties can be stabilized sufficiently to enter into the 
formal processes of inference that constitute that compositional 
structure. In moving from primitive sense-based concepts to the concepts 
involved in linguistic behavior, we encounter typical problems such as 
those of context sensitivity and collateral information. To solve these 
problems we may need to posit a symbolic structure over which to define 
direct operations in the form of context-free rules. Smith's account 
doesn't seem to have the resources to deal with this problem. To give just 
one concrete example, one way of approaching the problem of designing 
connectionist models in which the behavior to be modeled involves 
representations of higher order than the ones based on observable 
properties is precisely to reduce the level of distribution of the 
representations. This can be done by building the symbolic structures 
directly into the hardware (the architecture) of the network or by several 
other methods. One way or another, the requirement seems to be for 
some sort of hybrid models in which the lowest level procedures are 
broadly connectionist but the higher level redescriptions are broadly 
symbolic (Cf. Hendler, 1989). 
 What Smith's proposal  is in need of, then, is some way of grouping 
the partitions that give rise to primitive objects and properties into more 
coarse-grained constituents onto which to project proper semantic 
distinctions. To be able to do that, we need some previous semantic 
criteria that will let us discriminate between which properties belong to 
which concepts and which do not. Such semantic criteria are not easily 
recovered using Smith's own theoretical resources. For, given his 
perspectival and dynamical view, it doesn't seem possible to posit a 
principled distinction that lets us discriminate without circularity between 
those inferences that will count as part of the meaning of a concept and 
those that won't. What is lacking from Smith's philosophical perspective 
is thus a proper account of the relations between constituent properties 
and concepts. What he offers instead is just a development of the earlier 
ideas pursued in metaphorical terms. The moral of his story, regarding 
conceptual registration is simple, but disappointing: 'we individuate properties 
and relations in the same way as we individuate ordinary (particular) individuals 
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—through analogous processes of separation, stabilization, long-distance 
coordination across breaks in effective coupling, and the like' (OOO, p. 317). 
There is also, however, an appeal to the social structures that sustain the 
phenomena of participation and commitment involved in inferential 
processes. So perhaps one way of understanding the processes of 
inference that characterize higher levels of cognition is to take these 
processes to be, à la Brandom, 'instituted by social-practical activity' 
(Brandom 1994, xiii). But while Brandom turns his whole project into an 
explanation of the explicit normativity of inference in terms of such 
implicit normative practices, Smith deals with the issue only in rather 
vague and metaphorical terms. 
 
 
7. The Metaphysical Picture. 
 
 It is only at the very end of the book that an overall vision of 
Smith's project comes to the surface, combining all the twists, 
distinctions and theses defended so far. Yet, in a way there are no 
surprises. The metaphysical story is one that we know already. It is the 
physical story (lower-case 'p') applied to the whole world (cf. OOO, p. 323). 
It is grounded in what he calls immanent induction: 'a way of being grounded 
that is ultimately unregistered, inexorably participatory (partially 
connected), and to a degree ineliminably first-person' (OOO, p. 321). The 
claim is not that this is the only plausible metaphysical story. It is that it 
is one plausible metaphysical story but, arguably, one that meets the 
basic criteria of plausibility described throughout the book. Accordingly, 
the world is not a clear-cut kingdom of categories. It is rather a kingdom 
of indefiniteness at all levels. The world is depicted 
 
as one of cosmic and ultimately ineffable particularity: a critically 
rich and all-enveloping deictic flux. Neither formally rigid nor 
nihilistically sloppy, the flux sustains complex processes of 
registration: a form of interaction, subsuming both representation 
and ontology, in which "s-regions" or subjects stabilize patches of 
the flux, in part through processes of intervention, adjusting and 
building them and beating them into shape, and also through 
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patters of disconnection and long-distance coordination, necessary 
in order to take the patch to be an object, or more generally, to be 
something in and of the world .      
   (OOO, p. 247) 
 
 
 The aim is not to deny that there exist clear-cut categories. It is 
rather to claim that in order to create those categories, we have to fight 
and wrestle with what is, in principle, just a pure metaphysical flux. 
Smith's successor metaphysics is thus meant to occupy a middle ground 
from which it is possible to (i) do justice to what is right about 
constructivism and realism; (ii) sustain a notion of pluralism that avoids 
the risks of radical relativism and incommensurability problems; (iii) be 
irreduccionist (iv) re-think some of the central notions of modern 
philosophy (notions such as object, truth, physical, etc.), and (v) be 
foundational without being grounded in any special category (cf. OOO, pp. 
345-346). 
 What happens then to the popular metaphor of 'nature's joints'? It 
is here where Smith's position seems to be most vulnerable. He certainly 
does not deny the existence of 'joints'. Smith is not advocating that how 
the world turns out to be is arbitrary or subject-dependent. Particular 
things are supposed to emerge from the interaction between the s- and o- 
regions. Yet, very little is said about how this interaction takes place, or 
evolves as to result in a particular structured world. Rather than a settled 
metaphysical picture, what we get is a recipe indicating the right 
methodological principles we should keep in mind when constructing our 
metaphysics. In accounting for how we should go about this, Smith 
focuses on a reductionist assumption; it is this reductionism he wants to 
avoid. The cure for reductionism seems to be to whole-heartedly embrace 
a holistic alternative strategy, one which appeals to the larger context of 
the conventions and constraining practices of a society of intelligent 
beings. But even the appeal to this larger context seems to require 
precisely the kind of a priori assumptions (about entities and boundaries) 
that Smith is explicitly disallowing. Thus, Smith looks to be violating his 
own principle of irreduction. This is hardly surprising since a project 
governed by such a principle is surely likely to become, if not self-refuting, 
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at least highly unstable. We will constantly have to revise the categorical 
partitions generated by our metaphysical theory since the central principle 
of our metaphysics is not to settle on any specific metaphysical principle. 
 This unstability, this on-going revision of our own categorization as 
the result of a constant interaction between us and the world, makes me 
think of Smith's position as —to a certain extent— similar to a Dynamical 
Systems perspective in Cognitive Science. Of course there are clear and 
important dissimilarities. For example, the prominence assigned to the 
notion of representation (the general idea, within the Dynamical Systems 
approach is that internal representations are an unnecessary and 
unproductive posit for the analysis of real-time, environmentally-
embedded behavior) and even the nature of the inquiry (metaphysical in 
Smith's case and mostly empirical for the Dynamical Systems' theorist). 
But there are some surprising similarities which we can use as a way of 
clarifying some of the more metaphorical claims in OOO and of making 
contact with further themes of mainstream Cognitive Science. For 
instance, both parties agree that cognitive/intentional systems are often 
characterized in terms of continuous circular exchanges between the 
physical / biological features of an organism and those of the environment 
in which the organism is embedded and functioning. In both cases, where 
content-involving descriptions are suitable for the explanation of such a 
cognizer's behavior, they involve a notion of content that is characterized 
by the abilities of the systems to interact in specific ways with the world 
in which they are situated. The relevant systemic properties are thus not 
individualistic properties in the classical, standard sense, i.e., they are 
not intrinsic, context independent properties of the system whose 
behavior we trying to explain. Instead, the properties that count for the 
characterization of intentional content are, in both approaches, external, 
context- and environment-dependent properties of the system.  
 As a result, the notion of internal content carriers or vehicles has 
vanished from both the Dynamical Systems and from Smith's approach. 
We know already what we find instead in Smith: complex processes of 
stabilization of an original and unstable metaphysical flux. What we find 
in the Dynamical Systems case is a general formalism based on the idea 
of an abstract geometric state space whose dimensionality depends on the 
number of relevant system parameters. The system's behavior is then 
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explained in terms of location and motion within that space. Constructs 
are defined that capture properties of certain points or regions in the 
space. The mathematics typically specifies a dynamical law which 
determines how the values of a set of state variables evolve through time 
(see e.g. Abraham and Shaw 1992 for more details).  
 This picture bears a clear resemblance to the dynamical and 
perspectival view of metaphysics defended by Smith. Nothing in either 
picture preserves the idea of a particular computational state as the 
vehicle of the content that explains a given behavior of the system. 
Without this idea of a 'vehicle', we lose (in both scenarios) the idea of 
content as constituted by intrinsic properties of the system8. Faced with 
the question of what it is for a system to have a belief with such-and-
such content, we find that in both cases it is the system's abilities to act in 
a larger environment that counts. Those abilities are not what they are 
merely in virtue of some underlying intrinsic physical structure. Instead, 
what matters are the superstructural facts concerning the space of 
environmen tal interactions into which the system enters: 
 
One of the key metaphysical shifts in the AAA [Autonomous, 
Adaptive, Anticipative Dynamical System] approach lies in a shift 
from understanding complex system identities in static structural 
terms to understanding them in active process terms ... Intelligent 
systems ... are adaptable, for unless they can constantly adapt to 
mitigate or compensate for disturbing signals, they will be disrupted 
and, losing their cohesion, lose their identity as that sort of system 
... This kind of organized responsiveness, especially when based on 
self-organization, leads to a complex, developing system identity, an 
individuality of internal conditions distinctive of intelligent, learning 
systems. 
(Hooker & Christensen, 1998, p. 106) 
 
 As I said, Smith's proposal is based on the idea of searching for a 
set of criteria that determine particularity, without making any a priori 
commitments to the metaphysics which allegedly underlies those criteria. 
The search is thus constant and, especially at the beginning, unstable. 
For what will eventually turn out to be such and such object or subject is 
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the result of an active process in which both the s- and the o- region have 
to constantly adapt to each other. They both have to compensate for 
'disturbing signals' from the environment in which they are embedded. 
That is exactly how the Dynamical System approach understands the idea 
of a system's identity. 
 Furthermore, both in Smith's and in the Dynamical System's 
approach, the system's skills —as opposed to any supervenient properties 
of its internal structure— are precisely what gives the system its identity. 
The system's skills, its 'organized responsiveness' to the environment 
and to itself are the only reliable signals able to drive some kind of self-
regulating mechanism which, in turn, makes the system the system it is. 
 The parallelism between Smith and Dynamical Systems also helps 
illustrate what has already been mentioned as a glaring objection to 
Smith's project. Smith wants to disallow any assumptions about what is 
relevant to determining particularity. Particulars are supposed to emerge 
from the interaction between the s- and the o- regions within the 
metaphysical flux. They are the equivalent of attractors in a dynamical 
system. But, the emergence of an attractor is only possible once the 
parameters that define the geometric state space have been determined. 
We can make the dimensions of that semantic space correspond to 
observable (sensory) properties or we can make the dimensions 
correspond to social/aesthetic properties. But one way or another, in 
order to have certain patterns of activity in a dynamical hyperspace, the 
dimensions have to be fixed. Dynamical Systems approaches, unburdened 
by Smith's metaphysical agenda, can afford to make the necessary 
assumption. Smith, alas, cannot. 
 It must be admitted, however, that the Dynamical Systems approach 
has thus far been most successfully pursued in cases where the 
parameters to which the system is responding are straightforwardly 
physical, and are available to the system as ambient, proximal stimuli. 
This is the case, for example, in dynamical explanations of reaching and 
grasping in infants (see e.g. Thelen 1995). Such models are not 
successful, as yet, in providing explanations of more complex, often 
language-related phenomena. The same, we saw, seems to be true of 
Smith's proposal. Smith claims, in his defense, that he is not interested 
in meaning but in meaningfulness; something more dynamic and unstable 
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than whatever is relevant for the application of language-related notions. 
But one wonders whether a theory that has as its main aspiration the 
provision of a general theory of intentionality can really afford not to be 
more explicit about the fate of linguistic concepts.  
 Overall, then, although Smith's holistic and anti-reductionist views 
are forcefully presented, the question still remains as to whether what 
OOO provides is a substantive theory of intentionality or just a set of 
constraints upon a theory of how intentionality emerges. The 
metaphysical project was to steer a path between naive realism and pure 
constructivism. Yet, most of the time the reader seems to be left 
oscillating between these two poles without a stable resting point. 
Nonetheless, Smith succeeds in bringing to light, and sometimes 
challenging, some of the deepest assumptions buried in contemporary 
attempts to explain intentional phenomena. The book hints at a truly 
non-causal and non-physicalistic characterization of intentional 
properties. Unfortunately it delivers only part of what it promises, and 
many of the arguments will be persuasive only to someone who is already 
committed to Smith's own desiderata. Such doubts aside, Smith does us a 
great service in pursuing this genuinely alternative vision. It is still a view 
from the trenches, and much remains muddy and unclear. But it is also a 
valiant and thought-provoking meditation that rewards serious study and 
should be of great value to anyone interested in metaphysics and 
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1 As we shall see, even this way of phrasing the problem contains 
some of the assumptions that Smith challenges. It presupposes e.g. that 
there is a sharp distinction between representation and what represents, 
between something that is out there in the world and something that is 
not: 'In philosophy, it is traditional to view representation as independent 
of ontology ... [T]he rest of the book [can be taken] as a proposal for the 
consequences of its [this view] being false' (OOO, p. 42, footnote 18). 
 
2 This is probably why, interestingly, Smith only mentions Turing once 
in the whole book (OOO, p. 79), in the context of the standard —abstract, 
and mathematical— view about computation that Smith is criticizing. 
 
3 This notion of constitution ought to be distinguished from another 
kind of relation, also sometimes called a constitutive one, but which is 
more logical than metaphysical. The logical notion of constitution amounts 
to something like a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that 
something has to meet for being a thing of a certain kind. In current 
debates, the phrase 'being constitutive of' —as opposed to 'constituting'— 
tends to refer to this logical cousin of the metaphysical notion. Thus even 
though it is constitutive of the number 2 to be the successor of the 
number 1 (in the logical sense of constitution), 2 is not constituted (in 
the metaphysical sense) by being a successor of 1. 
 
4 Of course, similar considerations have been invoked in support of 
functionalism, a paradigmatically internalist position in Artificial 
Intelligence. The difference is that, for the functionalist, the role involves 
only permissible moves in a inner economy, whereas, for the 
institutionalist, the roles are defined in terms of wider, usually socio-
pragmatic, settings. 
 




6 It is worth mentioning that Smith's recognition of this problem is 
not entirely new. The circularity in trying to explain intentional properties 
by invoking supervenient elements each of which is already intentional 
has been noted in various forms by e.g. Bickhard (1993. See also Bickhard 
& Richie, 1983), Dennett (1975), Cummins (1983) and Lloyd (1989, pp. 8-9). 
 
7 Smith does not go as far as e.g. Brandom regarding this issue. 
Brandom explicitly endorse the thought that 'only communities, not 
individuals, can be interpreted as having original intentionality' (Brandom, 
1994, p. 61) 
 
8. The connection between the idea of a 'vehicle' of content and the 
internalist thesis of content as constituted by intrinsic properties is not 
presented here as one of necessity. Mark Bickhard's work on interactive 
representation (see e.g. Bickhard, 1993) is a prime illustration of the 
contingency of that connection. In Bickhard's proposal, content is 
explained in terms of internal-to-the-system functional links between 
current system states and expected internal outcome if a certain action is 
carried out. This account of content is certainly intrinsic to the system 
and does not involve a 'vehicle' or content-carrying token. 
